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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant

to

Section 78-2a-

3(2)(e) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the initial plea in

abeyance agreement?
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that it had jurisdiction over Appellant and her
probation even though the initial 18 month probation period had

expired~

STANDARD OF REVIEW
For the first issue presented herein the standard for review is abuse of discretion standard.
State v Cloud. 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986).

There is abuse of discretion where there is

harmful error. State v Verde, 770 P.2d 116. 120 (Utah 1989).

In State v Kni\:ht. 734 P.2d

913, 919 (Utah 1987) the court held that in assessing whether harmless error occurred the court
should focus on whether the error undermines the reviewing court's confidence in the verdict.
The second issue is a question of law where this court accords the trial court's conclusions of law
no particular deference and where this court reviews said conclusions for correctness. State v
Grate. 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah Ct App. 1997).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Page

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

7

Section 77-2a-4 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure

11

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged in an information with Count I, Welfare Fraud, a 2nd degree
felony. Rec. pg 1-3.
On or about October 17, 1996. Appellant executed a plea in abeyance agreement - Rec -

pgs 36-40 and pled guilty

to

Welfare Fraud. a 2nd degree felony wherein restitution in a set

amount was ordered. T - 103 pgs 4-14.
to

Appellant appeared before the trial court on an Order

Show Cause on June 10, 1999 for failure to pay restitution.

T - 103 - pg 20-29.

On

September 2, 1999 Appellant's plea in abeyance was set aside and appellant was sentenced for
a 3rd degree felony and placed on 36 months of supervised probation requiring appellant to pay
55,888.72 in restitution.

T - 103 pgs 61 - 68.

Appellant now appeals her conviction and

sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Oct. 17, 1996 appellant entered into a plea in abeyance agreement to Welfare Fraud,
a third degree felony, whereby appellant was placed on 18 months of bench probation and
ordered

to

pay restitution in the amount of $7997. The restitution amount was included in the

plea in abeyance agreement.

Rec. pg 37.

The felony was to be reduced to a class A

misdemeanor upon completion of the probation period.

Rec. pg 38.

Appellant now contends

that her court appointed counsel did not effectively represent her because she alleges that he did
not tell her she had the right to challenge the restitution amount.
On Aug. 5, 1998 the attorney general filed a motion to show cause.

Rec. pg 48.

On

May 12, 1999, the Office of Attorney General filed another motion for order to show cause with
warrant.

Rec. pg 56.

warrant.

Rec. pg 64.

Appellant's probation,

On June 7, 1999 Appellant was arrested on the Order to Show Cause
There were discussions concerning the court's jurisdiction over
T - 103 pgs 22-26: T - 103 pgs 37, 39-40, 42, 46-47: and 59-60. On

Sept. 2, 1999 the court stayed the execution of sentence for conviction of a third degree felony

and placed appellant on 36 months supervised probation.

T - 103 pgs 61-68.

The Appellant

now appeals the entire judgment in this case.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The issues raised by Appellant have been researched by her appellant counsel and the first
issue is considered by counsel to be meritless: however, counsel's opinion of the second issue
is that it has merit.

Appellant's trial counsel stated for the record his understanding of the parties' plea
agreement including the amount of restitution and permitted to be filed with the court the written
plea agreement containing the same restitution figure. The appellant failed to object or cause her
attorney to object to the restitution figure.

Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

The state did not file an order to show cause seeking to revoke appellant's probation until
some 20 months after appellant was placed on probation. The State filed another order to show
cause and served appellant with the same 32 months after appellant was placed on probation.
The court lost jurisdiction because appellant was not served until over a year after her plea in
abeyance term had expired.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

DID APPELLANT RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL DURING THE INITIAL PLEA IN ABEY ANCE AGREEMENT?
In searching the record for anything that might arguably support an appeal on this issue

it

is necessary to refer to the record and trial transcripts to see if anything exists on the record

that supports appellant's contention that she did not receive effective assistance of counsel. At
the date of the entry of the plea the court admonished the appellant pursuant to Rule II of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Court in State v Johnson. 823 P.2d 484. 487 (Utah

App. 1991) held that the appellant can raise an issue for the first time on appeal where the record
is adequate and he has new counsel. Here. appellant's trial counsel was different than his present
counsel.

Accordingly. and one prong of the test is satisfied; however. the other prong is

lacking here.

The record states nothing of appellant's disagreement with the restitution amount

or that she indicated to her counsel any contrary amount.

The plea in abeyance agreement

itself which bears appellant's signature states the restitution amount of $7997.00.

Rec. 36-40.

Further. the plea in abeyance agreement contains several handwritten modifications. but none to
the restitution amount. Rec.38. Moreover, appellant's trial counsel stated to the court the plea
agreement including the restitution figure and the changes that were handwritten into the written
plea agreement, Rec. 103 pgs 3, 4 and the court went further to calculate the monthly amount
needed to pay the restitution off during the term of probation. Rec. 103 pgs 6,7.

The court

then questioned appellant concerning the plea agreement, and she told the court that she had read
the plea agreement and had spoken with her counsel regarding the same and that he had made
it "pretty clear" to her. Rec. 103 pgs 7,8.

On June 10, 1999 when the appellant appeared

before the trial court on an order to show cause she explained to the court that she knew she had
to pay the 58.000 and that due to emotional and financial problems she had been unable to do
so. Rec. 103 pg 21.

Throughout the record during both the plea and the final sentencing in

the trial court appellant never once told the court that she had been misled or otherwise tricked
into paying an unfair or incorrect amount of restitution. The record is completely void of any

indication that appellant had any disagreement with the restitution figure or that there was even
a need for a restitution hearing.

Even if there were an adequate trial record. there is a

presumption of effective assistance of counsel and that such counsel exercises sound trial
strategy. State v Villarreal. 857 P.2d 949. 954 (Utah App. 1993).

The court in Strickland v

Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687; 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) set out the tests
to determine ineffective assistance of counsel: (I) the appellant must show that the attorney
rendered a dificient performance that fell below the objective standard of reasonable professional
Judgement and (2) that the attorney's dificient performance prejudiced the appellant.

The

appellant has the burden to show the dificient performance. State v Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405
(Utah 1986).

The court in Hill v Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) stated that to show

sufficient prejudice the appellant had to show there was a reasonable probability that but for the
attorney's errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
Here, the Appellant's burden on this issue is not supported by the record as recited above.
This issue is raised for the first time on appeal and is without merit.

POINT II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT IT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT AND HER PROBATION EVEN
THOUGH THE INITIAL 18 MONTH PROBATION PERIOD HAD
EXPIRED?

Most of the case law in this area concerns the imposition of sentence and the placing an
individual on probation.

This analysis should also apply to plea in abeyance probation because

once the defendant is placed on probation she is being punished.

The key point, whether there

is a stay of execution of sentence or imposition of sentence or a plea in abeyance, is whether or
not probation is imposed,

In trying to get around the coun's loss of jurisdictino the state

conceded this point in its argument in State v Moya, 815 P,2d 1312 (Utah App, 1991) that the
probation had been imposed and not executed; however, the coun noted that the state failed to
explain how the incident repon could have properly been filed if its argument were correCL
Similarly, here appellant was placed on probation pursuant to a plea agreement; accordingly
probation (or punishment) was imposed notwithstanding the fact that appellant had not actually
been sentenced,

The coun in M.Qxa reversed the trial coun's revocation of defendant's

probation and held that the defendant's probation was not "tolled" upon his violation of
conditions during the time of his probation,

In the instant case the state did not file its first

Motion for Order to Show Cause until approximately 4 months after the plea in abeyance
agreement was entered Rec, pg 48 although the violation(s) of not paying restitution arguably
occurred during the tenn of her probation, Therefore, the fact that appellant may have been in
violation during the term of her probation is insufficient to revoke her probation,
The issue decided by the coun in State v Green, 757 P,2d 462 (Utah 1988) is helpful
with regard to plea in abeyance probations,

One of the issues the coun in Grttrr had to decide

was whether the statute there automatically terminated defendant's probation after 18 months of
probation regardless of the occurrence of a violation during the term of probation,

The statute

contained mandatory language that the defendant's probation would be terminated after the 18
months of probation if probation was completed without violation, The state argued that the
statute does not automatically terminate defendant's probation unless the defendant commits no
probation violations during the 18 month probation term,

The state's argument is consistent

with the trial coun's ruling in the instant case for the coun felt that appellant's plea in abeyance

would end in 18 months so long as she had complied with all her conditions of probation or in
other words had no probation violations.

Rec 103 pg 46 Ln 12-19.

The Green court stated

that the state's argument or interpretation of the statute at issue would create absurd results such
as leaving defendants in a perpetual state of limbo serving a fictional probation would could
theoretically be revoked decades later.
same situation.

G..rITn at 464.

Here, the appellant is in somewhat the

Appellant's 18 month probationary term came and went without the state filing

a motion for order to show cause.

Approximately 4 months after appellant's probation had

ended a motion was filed and then another motion for order to show cause was filed on May 12,
1999, and appellant was arrested on June 7, 1999 Rec. 56 - 64 a year after appellant thought
her 18 month probation term had terminated.

The court in

Mm'a had this same concern for the

state of perpetual limbo in situations where imposition of probation is indeterminately stayed as
illustrated by the following:
The result eschewed in G..rITn. that defendant could be potentially
exposed to an indefinite probationary tenn, would similarly be
present where imposition of probation was indeterminately stayed.
Mm'a at 1317.
Accordingly, the issue discussed herein in the

.Gl:ITn case is analogous to the instant case because

there was a probation tenn that was to terminate within 18 months if no violations during that
term. and the Moya case is analogous here because the court did discuss the undesirable effect
of permitting revocation of an indeterminately stayed imposition of probation. Both cases were
reversed and both courts expressed concern for leaving the defendant in a perpetual state of
limbo.
The trial court cannot properly revoke a probationer's probation if there was not an order
to show cause filed and appellant served with the order to show cause giving her notice of the
hearing.

State v Grate, 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997).

Here, a motion for order to show

cause was not filed within the time period of appellant's probation let alone service of the order
to show cause.

Finally, the statute governing plea in abeyance violations, Section 77-2a-4 of

the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. outlines a procedure much like that of a standard stay of
imposition or stay of execution probation.

In fact, subsection one states that" If. at any time

during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement. information comes to the attention of the
prosecutor or court" that a violation has occurred there may be an order to show cause filed.
Accordingly. the cases set out above apply equally to a plea in abeyance situation as to a standard
probation.

The trial court has jurisdiction to enforce restitution regardless of whether or not the
probation term has expired. State v Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203 (Utah App. 1992). In the Dickey
case the defendant was placed on twelve months of probation and approximately 4 years later an
order to show cause was issued for his failure to pay restitution.
over twO years later.

Defendant was arrested a little

The trial court held a hearing and ordered defendant to pay the balance

of the restitution in the amount of $2,604.26 and entered judgment to that effect. The court in
Dickey held that "Utah recognizes restitution as an independent legal remedy under the applicable
criminal code and grants the court independent jurisdiction to compel its payment. Dickey at
1206.

The Dickey trial court apparently entered a restitution judgment. Accordingly, the trial

court had authority to enforce restitution in appellant's instant case by entering a judgment in the
amount of restitution and leaving appellant on prohation for continued enforcement.

However,

the trial court erred in the instant case by striking the plea in abeyance agreement and then
finding appellant guilty of welfare fraud, a third degree felony, and staying the execution of
sentence.

The court went further than authorized by Dickey because striking appellant's plea

in abeyance and convicting her of a third degree felony had no correlation to collection of
restitution.

Accordingly, the court exceeded its jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein alleged, the Appellant was denied a fair trial in Case No.
961500447. and the judgment and sentence should be set aside and Appellant should be granted
a new trial.

ADDENDUM
Please see Addendum

DA TED on this the 12th day of May. 2000.

SHERRI PALMER & ASSOCIATES
By: Kenneth L. Combs
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing Brief has been served

Oll

the Office of

the Attorney General and upon appellant, by delivery of a true copy via regular mail on the 29th
day of May, 2000.

KENNETH L. COMBS

ADDENDUM NO.1
Rule 11 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:

(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill. and
may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to

counsel and does not desire counsel:
(2) the plea is voluntarily made:
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right
to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the

attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived:
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is
entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements:
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea,

A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the

charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction:
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum
mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a

ADDENDUM NO.2
Section 77-2a-4(l) of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure:

(I)

If. at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement. information comes to the

attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that a defendant has violated any condition of
the agreement. the court, at the request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion
and affidavit. or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear
before the court at a designated time and place

to

show cause why the court should not find the

terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be terminated.
If. following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has failed

to

substantially

comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the
agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the
offense

to

which the original plea was entered.

Upon entry of judgment of conviction and

imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to
termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the court.

